# 2AC---Kentucky RR---Round 1

## Civil Service

### Movements thing---2AC

#### Trump crushes movements, but the aff solves.

Michael Sainato 25. Labor reporter. "Trump's attack on federal unions a 'test case' for broader assault, warn lawyers." The Guardian. 3/1/2025. theguardian.com/us-news/2025/may/01/trump-federal-unions-labor-bargaining-rights

The Trump administration is seeking to strip collective bargaining rights from large swaths of federal employees in a test case union leaders argue is part of a broader attack on US labor unions that could land before the US supreme court.

A Trump win would deliver a severe blow to labor unions in the US. Some 29.9% of all federal workers were represented by labor unions in 2024 compared to 11.1% for all US workers.

On 27 March, Donald Trump issued an executive order, citing national security, to exempt collective bargaining at several federal departments for more than 1 million workers.

The order was made in tandem with lawsuits filed by the Trump administration against federal unions, including against affiliates of the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) in a Texas court where only one judge, a conservative, presides over the court, and the National Treasury Employees Union chapter 73 in a Kentucky court.

Last week, unions filed motions to dismiss the lawsuits, and have filed their own lawsuits against Trump’s executive order. Bipartisan legislation has also been introduced in the House to restore collective bargaining rights for targeted federal workers.

Rushab Sanghvi, AFGE’s general counsel, expects a decision in their lawsuit against the administration next month. But he expects the four cases are likely to end up in the supreme court.

Sanghvi sees the administration’s legal action as part of a broader, authoritarian efforts against labor unions, law firms, universities and other opposition to the Trump administration. Authoritarian governments, historically, have prioritized eliminating labor unions in consolidating power, he said.

“The stakes for the labor movement are extremely broad,” said Sanghvi. The administration is attempting to get rid of collective bargaining in the federal sector “for anyone they think will oppose them”, he said.

“That’s huge for our members but it’s also huge for the labor movement as a whole because they’re not going to stop here. They are going to go further and this is just a test. If they win here, they are just going to keep going and going until they get rid of all unions.”

AFGE’s national president, Everett Kelley, called the executive order retaliatory. “AFGE is not going to be intimidated by a bully who is throwing a temper tantrum because our union is beating them in the court of law and in the court of public opinion,” Kelley said.

Liz Shuler, the president of the AFL-CIO, the largest federation of labor unions in the US, said Trump’s executive order “breaks federal law with an alarming and dangerous escalation of attacks on our most fundamental freedoms” and claimed it is a direct attack on every union, every union contract, and the right to collective bargaining in the US.

“This executive order is the very definition of union-busting,” Shuler said.

### Civil Service---2AC

#### Civil service outweighs:

#### Governance is key to cool-headed policymaking in the face of food shocks, pandemics, and environmental crises. That’s Shulman.

#### Err aff: it’s the only check against opaque risks we don’t know are coming.

### Diplomacy---2AC

#### Diplomacy checks extinction:

#### It defuses tensions in hotspots like Ukraine and Taiwan that otherwise go nuclear and spills over to cooperation on arms control, terror, and Arctic security. That’s Kimmage.

### Disease---2AC

#### Disease causes extinction:

#### 1. Mortality. Pathogens mutate, effecting every human and overwhelming biological resistance. That’s Kim.

#### 2. Impact Filter. Pandemics collapse cooperation, peacekeeping, and global investment, causing war. That’s Taylor.

### AT: Noy 22---2AC

#### Noy is unbelievably aff. It says history goes aff and that future pandemics will be worse.

Dr. Ilan Noy 22. Chair in the Economics of Disasters and Climate Change at the Victoria University of Wellington, PhD from the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Dr. Tomáš Uher, PhD, Professor at Masaryk University, “Four New Horsemen of an Apocalypse? Solar Flares, Super-volcanoes, Pandemics, and Artificial Intelligence”, Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, 1/15/2022, SpringerLink

High-Mortality Pandemics

A naturally occurring pandemic (i.e., not from an engineered pathogen) that would threaten human extinction is a very small probability event. However, historical accounts point to several instances where disease spread played an important role in causing very significant decline of specific populations. For example, the introduction of novel diseases to the Native American population during the European colonization of the Americas had deadly consequences. It is difficult to distinguish the effects of the diseases that came with the Europeans from the war and conflict they also brought with them. Nevertheless, during the first hundred years of the colonization period, the American population may have been reduced by as much as 90% (Ord 2020).

Moreover, two major pandemic events, the Justinian Plague in the sixth century and the Black Death in the fourteenth century appear to have been severe enough to cause a significant population decline of tens of percent in the populations they affected. Both events are believed to have been caused by plague, an infectious disease caused by the bacteria Yersinia Pestis (Christakos et al. 2005; Allen 1979). While there is a certain degree of uncertainty involved in studying these events’ societal impacts, historical accounts in combination with modern scientific methods provide us with some valuable insights into the effects they may have had on the societies of the time.

With respect to the possibility of a future catastrophic global pandemic, it appears that this risk is increasing significantly along with the advances in the field of synthetic biology and the rising possibility of an accidental or intentional release of an engineered pathogen. While some of the scientific efforts in the field of synthetic biology are directed towards increasing our understanding and our ability to prevent future catastrophic epidemic threats, the risk stemming from these activities is non-trivial, and may outweigh their benefits.

The Justinian Plague

The Justinian Plague severely affected the people of Europe and East Asia, though estimates of its overall mortality vary. Focusing exclusively on the first wave of the pandemic (AD 541–544), Muehlhauser (2017) suggests the pandemic was associated with a 20% mortality in the Byzantine empire. This estimate is based on the mortality rate estimated for the empire’s capital, Constantinople, by Stathakopoulos (2007) to produce a death toll of roughly 5.6 million. For a longer time span, AD 541 to 600, which included subsequent waves of the plague, scholars estimate a higher mortality rate of 33–50% (Allen 1979; Meier 2016).

The demographic changes associated with this high mortality led to a significant disruption of economic activity in the Byzantine empire (Gârdan 2020). A decline in the labour force caused a decline in agricultural production which led to food shortages and famine (Meier 2016). Trade also collapsed. Decreased tax revenues caused by the population decline initiated a major fiscal contraction and consequently a military crisis for the empire (Sarris 2002; Meier 2016). In the longer run, however, the massive reduction of the labour force appears to have had a positive economic effect for the surviving laborers, as the increased marginal value of labour caused a rise in real wages and per capita incomes. These beneficial effects for the survivors were also observed after the Black Death (Pamuk and Shatzmiller 2014; Findlay and Lundahl 2017).

The mortality and the disruption of activity the plague caused in the Byzantine empire also led to further direct and indirect cultural and religious consequences. Meier (2016) particularly highlights the plague’s indirect effect of an increase in liturgification (a process of religious permeation and internalization throughout society as defined by Meier 2020), the rise of the Marian cult, and the sacralization of the emperor.

The direct and indirect effects of the plague also appear to have had far-reaching and long-term political repercussions. The societal disruptions caused by the plague are believed to have significantly weakened the position of the Byzantine empire and arguably led to the decline of the Sasanian empire (Sabbatani et al. 2012). Interestingly, the pandemic indirectly favoured the nomadic Arab tribes who were less vulnerable to the contagion while traveling through desert and semi-desert environments during the initial expansion of Islam (Sabbatani et al. 2012).

Of note is the absence of a scientific consensus on the severity of the Justinian Plague’s impacts. For example, Mordechai and Eisenberg (2019) and Mordechai et al. (2019) argue against the maximalist interpretation of the historical evidence described above. They suggest that the estimated mortality rate of the plague is exaggerated, and that the pandemic was not a primary cause of the transformational demographic, political and economic changes in the Mediterranean region between the sixth and eighth century. Recently, White and Mordechai (2020) highlighted the high likelihood of the plague having different impacts in the urban areas of the Mediterranean outside of Constantinople.

The Black Death

The Black Death which ravaged Europe, North Africa, and parts of Asia in the middle of the fourteenth century is considered the deadliest pandemic in human history and potentially the most severe global catastrophe to have ever struck mankind. With respect to its mortality, Ord (2020) argues that the best estimate of its global mortality rate is 5–14% of the global population, largely based on Muehlhauser (2017).

The plague created a large demographic shock in the affected regions. It reduced the European population by approximately 30–50% during the 6 years of its initial outbreak (Ord 2020). It took approximately two centuries for the population levels to recover (Livi-Bacci 2017; Jedwab et al. 2019b). As the mortality rates appear to have been the highest among the working-age population, the effects on the labour force were acute (Pamuk 2007).

The plague's mortality, morbidity and the associated societal disruption led to a major decline in economic output both in Europe (Pamuk 2007) and the Middle East (Dols 2019). In Europe, however, this decline in economic output was smaller than the decline in population; output per capita began to increase within a few years of the initial outbreak (Pamuk 2007).

The large demographic shock caused by the plague led to a shift in the relative price of labour which, similarly to the Justinian Plague, had a positive impact on wages. With a reduced labour force, real wages and per capita incomes in many European countries increased and were sustained at higher levels for several centuries (Voigtländer and Voth 2013a; Jedwab et al. 2020; Pamuk and Shatzmiller 2014). Scott and Duncan (2001) point out that real wages approximately doubled in most countries of Europe in the century following the plague.

An additional insight into the long-run relationship between the Black Death’s mortality and per capita incomes in Europe is offered by Voigtländer and Voth (2013a). Using a Malthusian model, they suggest that over time, the rise in income caused by the plague’s mortality led to an increase in urbanization and trade. Furthermore, the increased tax burden (per capita), combined with the contemporary political climate, increased the frequency of wars. Consequently, higher urbanization and trade led to an increase in disease spread which along with a more frequent war occurrence caused a long-term increase in mortality and a further positive effect on per capita incomes. In this way, the Black Death appears to have created a long-lasting environment of high-mortality and high-income specifically in Western Europe, functioning as an important contributing factor to its economic growth in the next centuries (Alfani 2020). However, while in Western Europe incomes remained elevated over the next centuries, in Southern Europe they began to decline as the Southern European population started recovering after AD 1500 (Jedwab et al. 2020).

Apart from the positive effects on wages, the increased marginal value of labour combined with other factors had further economic and social implications. A decreased relative value of land and the lack of workforce to use it effectively caused land prices and land rents to decrease (Jedwab et al. 2020; Pamuk 2007). A decreased marginal value of capital assets in general led to a lapse in the enforcement of property rights (Haddock and Kiesling 2002). Interest rates and real rates of return on assets also decreased (Pamuk 2007; Jedwab et al. 2020; Pamuk and Shatzmiller 2014; Jordà et al. 2021; Clark 2016).

Higher wages in combination with a relative abundance of land increased people’s access to land/home ownership, likely reducing social inequality (Alfani 2020). On the other end of the income distribution, decreased incomes for landowners led to an overall decrease in income inequality (Jedwab et al. 2020; Alfani and Murphy 2017).

With respect to the effects on agriculture, the structure of agricultural output moved away from cereals to other crops following the plague. Furthermore, the workforce shortages and the incentives to increase the labour supply are believed to have caused a shift from male-labour intensive arable farming towards pastoral farming, consequently raising the demand for female labour (Voigtländer and Voth 2013b). However, while the Black Death appears to have caused certain structural agricultural changes, Clark (2016) finds no effect of the plague on agricultural productivity in the long run.

In terms of other social consequences, the evidence suggests that the plague's mortality reduced labour coercion, particularly throughout Western Europe (Jedwab et al. 2020; Haddock and Kiesling 2002; Gingerich and Vogler 2021). The increased bargaining power of labour caused by the plague’s demographic shock contributed to and accelerated the decline in serfdom and development of a free labour regime. Gingerich and Voler (2021) further argue that these effects may have had long-lasting political implications and that a decline of repressive labour practices (such as serfdom) permitted the development of more inclusive political institutions. They find that the regions with the highest mortality were more likely to develop participatory political institutions and more equitable land ownership systems. They find that centuries later, In Germany, the populations in these high-mortality regions were less likely to vote for Hitler’s National Socialist (Nazi) Party in the 1930 and 1932 elections in Germany.

However, the positive effects on the emergence of freer labour did not take place in Eastern Europe, where serfdom was sustained and even intensified. Robinson and Torvik (2011) attempt to explain this asymmetry arguing that these differential outcomes may have been caused by the varying power and quality of institutions. The authors suggest that opportunities generated by the increased bargaining power of labour, in an environment of weak institutions, were less likely to lead to a positive effect than in the case of regions with stronger institutions (with more robust rule-of-law or less corrupt or predatory practices).

Apart from causing a negative demographic shock to the affected populations, the Black Death appears to have caused further indirect demographic changes, particularly in Western Europe. The increased employment opportunities for females caused by worker shortages and a higher female labour demand led to a decline in fertility rates and an increased age of marriage (Voigtländer and Voth 2013b). This demographic transition to a population characterized by lower birth rates likely helped to preserve the high levels of per capita incomes and contributed to further economic development of certain parts of Europe, enabling it to escape the “Malthusian trap” in the following centuries (Pamuk 2007). Siuda and Sunde (2021) confirm the pandemic’s effect on the accelerated demographic transition empirically, as they find that greater pandemic mortality was associated with an earlier onset of the demographic transition across the various regions of Germany.

Unfortunately, the Black Death also led to an increase in the persecution of Jews (Finley and Koyama 2018; Jedwab et al. 2019a). Interestingly, Jedwab et al. (2019a) were able to estimate that in the case of regions with the highest mortality rates, the probability of persecution decreased if the Jewish minority was believed to benefit the local economy.

It is important to highlight that the long-term repercussions of the Black Death were highly asymmetrical. While in Western Europe the pandemic appears to have led to some long-term dynamic shifts associated with increased wages, decreased inequality and a decrease in labour coercion, this was not the case for other regions. A decrease in wages was observed for example in Spain (Alfani 2020) and Egypt. In Spain, the plague's demographic impact on an already scarce population caused a long-lasting negative disruption to the local trade-oriented economy. The workforce disruption in Egypt led to a collapse of the labour-intensive irrigation system for growing crops in the Nile valley, with consequent disastrous effects on the rural economy (Alfani 2020). Borsch (2005) argues that the economic decline in Egypt caused by the Black Death “put an end to the power in the heartland of the Arab world” (p. 114) and to the impressive scientific and technological developments that came out of this region.

A consensus for an explanation of the Black Death’s varied impacts across regions, and their determinants, does not appear to exist. However, several researchers attempt to provide partial insights. For example, Alfani (2020) considers the differential outcomes to be broadly dependent upon the initial conditions in each region. More specifically, both Robinson and Torvik (2011) and Pamuk (2007) propose that the asymmetry of impacts can largely be explained by the differences in the institutional environments of the affected societies.

It is argued that the Black Death defined the threshold between the medieval and the modern ages, similarly to the way the Justinian Plague did for antiquity and the Middle Ages (Horden 2021). Furthermore, the differential long-term outcomes of the Black Death likely provided a significant contribution to the so-called “Great Divergence” between Europe and the rest of the world and the “Little Divergence” between North-western and Southern and Eastern Europe (Jedwab et al. 2020; Pamuk 2007).

From this perspective, it would seem rational to conclude that apart from causing substantial and long-term demographic, economic, political, and cultural changes, both the Justinian Plague and the Black Death likely significantly altered the course of human history.

Considering the above, it is not unreasonable to expect that a pandemic of a similar magnitude to these past catastrophes would do the same in the present day. However, what societal impacts a pandemic of similar or higher mortality would inflict in the twenty-first century has not really been the subject of any study, as far as we were able to identify. A possibility exists, given the newly developed capacity of humanity to create new pathogens, that the outcomes of a future catastrophic pandemic will be even more adverse than those of the Justinian Plague and the Black Death.

Probability

In terms of the probability of naturally occurring pandemics, an informal survey of participants of the Global Catastrophic Risk Conference in Oxford in 2008 shows that the median estimate for a probability of a natural pandemic killing more than 1 billion people before the year 2100 was surveyed to be 5%, and the probability of such pandemic to cause human extinction was 0.05%. Ord (2020) uses a slightly broader definition of existential risk, which apart from human extinction also includes a permanent reduction of human potential. He estimates the probability of an existential risk stemming from a natural pandemic in the next 100 years to be 0.01%.

### Pollution---2AC

#### Pollution causes extinction. It causes emissions, disease, collapses the ozone layer, and renders everyone infertile. That’s Fuller.

#### Ozone holes make the planet uninhabitable and wreck the environment. That’s Wanser.

## Presidency

### Trump---2AC

#### Trump causes extinction:

#### 1. Multilat. Weakened cooperation makes us more vulnerable to every threat, while aggression draws us into wars. That’s Öniş.

**2. Rhetoric. He’s combative and unpredictable, undermining deterrence and causing miscalc. That’s Shen.**

### Democracy---2AC

#### Democracy checks all war:

#### They empirically never fight and favor peaceful dispute resolution. That’s Imai and Richmond.

### AT: Skidelsky---2AC

#### Skidelsky evidence is wrong.

#### Empirics are an aff warrant. No democracies have ever fought.

#### Yes causation. Democracy causes he

### AT: Glock---2AC

#### Glock is from the Manhattan institute, which is conservative and biased.

#### The card is about states and doesn’t assume federal unions’ focus on their mission instead of money.

## Subsets

### T-Subsets---2AC

#### Counter-interp: subsets affs are topical.

#### a) Aff ground. They rob the aff of subset-specific advantage ground and makes PICs compete.

#### b) Predictability. Labor law has never covered every worker. Their interp says ‘CBR for workers’ doesn’t exist in the status quo.

Sarah Anzia & Jessica Trounstine 24. Professor of public policy and political science at the University of California, Berkeley. Professor of political science at Vanderbilt University. "Building a Movement: The Parallel Paths of Public- and Private-Sector Unions in Early 20th Century America." University of California, Berkeley. 9/3/2024. gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/Anzia\_Trounstine\_PublicPrivateUnions\_09\_04\_24.pdf

Many scholars have noted these divergent trends and pointed to the very different legal structures governing labor-management relations in the private and public sectors as an important contributor. The NLRA of 1935 explicitly excludes the public sector from coverage (NLRA 1935, Sec.2. [§152.]). Government employees did not have similar legal protections as private-sector employees until decades later, and even then (for state and local workers) only at the state level, when during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, most states passed laws requiring government employers to recognize and collectively bargain with unions of their employees. From this, a conventional wisdom emerged that public- and private-sector unionization developed along separate paths—and that before the 1960s, organizations of government employees remained small, weak, and ineffective.

#### c) Reasonability. ‘Limits first’ races to nowhere.

#### No offense: functional limits like states, process, employment law, and natural limits check aff quantity, while legal disads and politics solve ground.

### AT: Substantially

#### ‘Substantial’ means of considerable value.

Sharon Prost 4. Former circuit judge. "Committee For Fairly Traded Venezuelan Cement v. United States." United States Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit. 2004. web.archive.org/web/20061001000000\*/http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/04opinions/04-1016.html

The URAA and the SAA neither amend nor refine the language of § 1677(4)(C). In fact, they merely suggest, without disqualifying other alternatives, a “clearly higher/substantial proportion” approach. Indeed, the SAA specifically mentions that no “precise mathematical formula” or “‘benchmark’ proportion” is to be used for a dumping concentration analysis. SAA at 860 (citations omitted); see also Venez. Cement, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1329-30. Furthermore, as the Court of International Trade noted, the SAA emphasizes that the Commission retains the discretion to determine concentration of imports on a “case-by-case basis.” SAA at 860. Finally, the definition of the word “substantial” undercuts the CFTVC’s argument. The word “substantial” generally means “considerable in amount, value or worth.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1993). It does not imply a specific number or cut-off. What may be substantial in one situation may not be in another situation. The very breadth of the term “substantial” undercuts the CFTVC’s argument that Congress spoke clearly in establishing a standard for the Commission’s regional antidumping and countervailing duty analyses. It therefore supports the conclusion that the Commission is owed deference in its interpretation of “substantial proportion.” The Commission clearly embarked on its analysis having been given considerable leeway to interpret a particularly broad term.

### --AT: Tax Court

#### Tax Court says ‘substantially’ is impossible to define and is about the term ‘substantially all,’ which is not in the rez.

US Tax Court 65, Dudderar v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 44 T.C 632, Vlex. July 23, 1965. https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/dudderar-v-comm-r-890913901

[\*\*13] If the statement were "all" not modified by the word "substantially," it would refer to either 100 percent or such a small variation from 100 percent that such variation might be said to be de minimis. The word "substantially," however, is an elastic word not so easily susceptible of definition. That term as used in a provision of the Internal Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921 dealing with corporate affiliations has been stated to mean all except a "negligible minority" interest. Ice Service Co. v. Commissioner, 30 F. 2d 230 (C.A. 2, 1929), affirming 9 B.T.A. 385 (1927). In construing these same statutes the Supreme Court in Handy & Harman v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 136 (1931), concluded that 75 percent of the shares of a related corporation "did not constitute substantially all of its stock," citing in a footnote the following cases: Ice Service v. Commissioner, 30 F. (2d) 230, 231; Commissioner v. Adolph Hirsch & Co., 30 F. (2d) 645, 646; American Auto Trimming Co. v. Lucas, 37 F. (2d) 801, 803; [\*\*14] United States v. Cleveland, P.&E. R. Co., 42 F. (2d) 413, 419; Commissioner v. Gong Bell Mfg. Co., 48 F. (2d) 205, 206; Onondaga Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F. (2d) 397, 399. The cases cited in this footnote involve percentage ownership of stock in the related corporations by the individuals specified by statute in amounts ranging from approximately 68 to approximately 85 percent. Similarly in construing the provisions with respect to affiliation contained in the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921 we specifically held that the combined holdings of two stockholders which were not in excess of 85.3 percent of the outstanding stock of the company which it was proposed be considered as an affiliate was insufficient to meet the statutory requirement of "substantially all," Gulf Coast Irrigation Co., 24 B.T.A. 958, 967 (1931), and cases there cited. HN5 We do not consider that the words "substantially all" as used in section 264(b)(1) should be defined to be a precise percentage to be used in every case without reference to the surrounding facts. Nevertheless section [\*\*15] 264(b)(1) does deal only with a quantitative amount in that it deals with money payments and therefore the words "substantially all" as used therein [\*638] must be given their ordinary meaning of all but a small negligible amount. 5Link to the text of the note Considering the purpose for which section 264(b)(1) was enacted, its legislative history as well as the factual situation present in the instant case, we conclude that the 73-percent payment in the instant case did not constitute "substantially all" the premiums on the insurance contract here involved. Since some uncontested adjustments were made in the notice of deficiency, Decision will be entered under Rule 50.

### AT: Workers

#### ‘Workers’ mean any worker. It’s the plural of ‘worker!’

Ramona Manglona 24. Chief district judge for the Northern Mariana Islands. "Lilles v. J.C. Tenorio Enter." 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114723.

B. The Workforce Act (48 U.S.C. § 1806(d))

After the CNRA was enacted, Congress passed other legislation adding to and amending CW-1 permit petition requirements. Relevant to this case is the July 24, 2018, passage of the 2018 U.S. Workforce Act, Pub. L. 115-218 (2018), 48 U.S.C. § 1806(d), which amended the CNRA's provisions. The Act made four major changes to the transition program that are pertinent to this case. First, the CW-1 permit may be valid for up to three years. 48 U.S.C. § 1806(d)(7)(B). Second, the Act now requires employers to apply to the U.S. Secretary of Labor ("SOL") for a temporary labor certification ("TLC") confirming that (1) there are insufficient U.S. workers

<Footnote begins>

"The term 'United States worker' means any worker who is-- (A) a citizen or national of the United States; (B) an alien who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence; or (C) a citizen of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, or the Republic of Palau (known collectively as the 'Freely Associated States') who has been lawfully admitted to the United States pursuant to-- (i) section 141 of the Compact of Free Association between the Government of the United States and the Governments of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (48 U.S.C. 1921 note); or (ii) section 141 of the Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Government of Palau (48 U.S.C. 1931 note)." 48 U.S.C. § 1806(i)(6).

<Footnote ends>

willing, able, and qualified to perform the services and (2) the nonimmigrant worker's employment would not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. Id. § 1806(d)(2)(A)(i).

### --AT: ILO

#### **ILO has no intent to define generally.**

ILO 81 – International Labor Organization, 1981, “Report VI (1): Safety and Health and the Working Environment,” International Labor Conference, 67th Session, https://webapps.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/1980/80B09\_513\_engl.pdf

5. For the purpose of the proposed instrument-

(a) the term " branches of economic activity " includes work in the public service ;

(b) the term " workers " means all employed persons, including public employees ;

(c) the term "workplace" should cover all places where workers need to be or to go by reason of their work and which are under the direct or indirect control of the employer ;

(d) the term "regulations" should cover all provisions given force of law by the competent authority or authorities.

#### It also says subsets are permitted.

ILO 81 – International Labor Organization, 1981, “Report VI (1): Safety and Health and the Working Environment,” International Labor Conference, 67th Session, <https://webapps.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/1980/80B09_513_engl.pdf>

The Government members of Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom submitted an amendment proposing to introduce in this Point also the possibility of the partial exclusion of certain categories of workers. As a similar amendment to Paragraph 3(2) had already been adopted with respect to branches of economic activity, no objection was raised to this amendment, which was adopted.

## CBR

### T-CBR---2AC

#### 1. We meet.

#### a) Textually. Plan in a vacuum is most objective and checks positional competition.

#### b) Functionally. [xxx]

#### 2. Counter-interp. ‘Collective bargaining rights’ require good faith bargaining to the point of impasse. This is the ‘universally recognized’ definition.

Harry Edwards 85. Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit. Amalgamated Transit Union Int'l v. Donovan, 1985 U.S. App. 1985. Lexis.

[\*950] In sum, Congress struck a delicate balance in section 13(c). The statute provides that state law should govern the labor relations of public transit authorities and their employees, but it conditions federal transit aid, in part, on the continuation of collective bargaining rights. In setting out those rights, Congress chose not to incorporate the entire structure and requirements of the NLRA into section 13(c), for to do so would force states to choose between federal transit aid and their exclusion from the coverage of the NLRA. On the other hand, Congress made it clear that federal labor policy would dictate the substantive meaning of collective bargaining for purposes of section 13(c). "Good faith" bargaining, to a point of impasse if necessary, over wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment has always been the essence of federally-defined collective bargaining rights; indeed, excluding the federal sector, it is the almost universally recognized definition of collective bargaining in the United States.

#### 3. Prefer it.

#### a) Predictability. “Universally recognized” definitions in law are key to prep. [xxx]

#### b) Overlimiting. [xxx].

#### c) Functional Limits. Employment Law CP, Cap K, the Econ DA solve.

#### 4. Reasonability. ‘Limits first’ races to nowhere.

#### ‘Strengthen’ means more likely to succeed.

Collins Dictionary no date. "STRENGTHEN THE LAW definition in American English", No Publication, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/strengthen-the-law

strengthen

verb

If something strengthens a person or group or if they strengthen their position, they become more powerful and secure, or more likely to succeed. [...]

## ASPEC

### ASPEC---2AC

#### 1. Counterinterp: affs must be topical. Further specification is regressive since they’ll shift the goalposts.

#### 2. Their interp justifies agent counterplans, which are unfair and steal the aff.

#### No offense: normal means and cross-ex checks.

## Con Con

### Conventions CP---2AC

#### 1. Permutation: do both.

#### 2. Permutation: do the counterplan. Either the counterplan includes a constitutional requirement and fiats Congress saying yes, or they say no because of inherency.

#### 3. Certainty is key.

Linda Jacobson 25. Senior reporter, former assistant director of the Education Writer's Associaton. "Legal Scorecard: How is the Trump Education Juggernaut Faring in Court?" The 74. 7/13/2025. the74million.org/article/legal-scorecard-how-is-the-trump-education-juggernaut-faring-in-court

But some call the department’s efforts to bring back employees lackluster, perhaps because it’s pinning its hopes on a victory before the Supreme Court.

“This is a court that’s been fairly aggressive in overturning lower court decisions,” said Smith, with the National Center for Youth Law.

His group’s lawsuit is one of two challenging cuts to the Office for Civil Rights, which lost nearly 250 staffers and seven regional offices. They argue the cuts have left the department unable to thoroughly investigate complaints. Of the 5,164 civil rights complaints since March, OCR has dismissed 3,625, Oglesby reported.

In a case brought by the Victim Rights Law Center, a Massachusetts-based advocacy organization, a federal district court judge ordered McMahon to reinstate OCR employees.

Even if the case is not reversed on appeal, there’s another potential problem: Not all former staffers are eager to return.

“I have applied for other jobs, but I’d prefer to have certainty about my employment with OCR before making a transition,” said Andy Artz, who was a supervising attorney in OCR’s New York City office until the layoffs. “I feel committed to the mission of the agency and I’d like to be part of maintaining it if reinstated.”

#### 4. Turn.

#### The counterplan runs away.

Hayes Brown 24. Editor at MSBNC, B.A. in International Relations from Michigan State University. "Blue States have good reason to fear a MAGA-led constitutional convention." MSN. 12/20/2024. msn.com/en-us/news/politics/blue-states-have-good-reason-to-fear-a-maga-led-constitutional-convention/ar-AA1wEa89?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=HCTS&cvid=d15a9ea50ef043f9a43343eb7dbcc730&ei=56.

Republicans have big plans in mind for when they reclaim the White House and both chambers of Congress in January. President-elect Donald Trump’s disruptive agenda spans across immigration, the economy and foreign policy. But Democrats around the country are concerned that the GOP has its sights set even higher: a complete rewrite of the Constitution.

At issue is a provision that allows Congress to call for a new convention to propose alterations to the country’s foundational text. But, as The New York Times recently reported, states like California are now racing to rescind their previous calls for a constitutional convention. Their fear is that even a convention called under Trump to deal with a narrow issue, like a balanced budget amendment, would lead to a “runaway convention” where anything and everything is on the table.

It’s not an unfounded worry on Democrats’ part. After all, the men who gathered in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787 were not there to draft a new constitution. The Continental Congress had only tasked the delegates with “the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation,” which only loosely governed the 13 independent American states. Instead, they emerged with a document that not only abolished the articles entirely but provided for a novel form of government.

Crucially, the draft that was presented to the states for ratification was purposefully incomplete. Under the Articles of Confederation, the only method of revision required unanimity from all 13 state legislatures. As you can imagine, this made the chance of amending them exceedingly low. The Constitution offered up two alternatives, both in Article V of the text:

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress.

The first method has been used to add 27 updates to the Constitution since it was ratified, most notably with the first Congress’ passage of the Bill of Rights. These first 10 amendments were crucial in blocking the near immediate calls for a second convention from the likes of Patrick Henry and other anti-Federalists. Since then, there have been sporadic calls over the years to convene a new gathering to overhaul the Constitution — but as with many reform movements, the politics of altering the status quo have been difficult to overcome.

As someone who loves to probe and prod at a juicy hypothetical, I can see why the idea of a new convention has both appeal and detractors. The amendment process in Congress has languished in the last half-century. Proposed amendments that would require a balanced budget, ban flag-burning and abolish the Electoral College have all failed to pass both the House and Senate and be sent to the states for approval. Taking proposals directly to a convention where new deals could be made and different coalitions forged would skirt the thorny issue of which party controls Congress at any given time.

**Extinction.**

J.T. Stanley 24. Co-Founder of Cocentric Policies. Former Internal Relations officer at Global and Inclusive Action for the Development of DR Congo. “Destabilization of the United States: The top X-factor EA neglects?” Effective Altruism. July 14, 2024. https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kmx3rKh2K4ANwMqpW/destabilization-of-the-united-states-the-top-x-factor-ea#Highlights

Destabilization could be the biggest setback for great power conflict, AI, bio-risk, and climate disruption.

Polarization plays a role in nearly every causal pathway leading to destabilization of the United States, and there is no indication polarization will decrease.

The United States fits the pattern of past democracies that have descended into authoritarian regimes in many key aspects.

The most recent empirical research on civil conflicts suggests the United States is in a category that has a 4% annual risk of falling into a civil conflict.

In 2022 (when this was originally written), Mike Berkowitz, ED of Democracy Funders Network and 80,000 Hours guest, believes there is 50% chance American democracy fails in the next 6 years.

For every dollar spent on depolarization efforts, there are probably at least a hundred dollars spent aggravating the culture war.

Destabilization of the United States could wipe out billions of dollars of pledged EA funds.

Note following the assassination attempt of former President Trump

This is the extended version[[1]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kmx3rKh2K4ANwMqpW/destabilization-of-the-united-states-the-top-x-factor-ea#_ftn1) of my 2022 draft submission[[2]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kmx3rKh2K4ANwMqpW/destabilization-of-the-united-states-the-top-x-factor-ea#_ftn2) to the Open Philanthropy (OP) Cause Area Competition. I am releasing it today because the section on accelerationist events and protecting politicians from assassination seems very salient given the last 24 hours. (Thanks to Woody Campbell for relevant and possibly prescient thoughts on the latter).

The overall topic of this piece is also salient for this 2024 election year. I have been pleasantly surprised how many EAs have mobilized this year around the issue of protecting American democracy… I wish this had been the situation back in 2020 or after January 6th or after I pushed this on the Forum and EAGs in 2022. Democracy is jeopardized not because of a single candidate but because of the forces that made the viability of such a candidate possible. Thus this issue cannot be addressed only in election years.

The worry I’ve had this year is that EAs will prioritize this area only until election day and then forget about it after January 20th, 2025. The degradation of American democracy and stability is not stopped *only* at the ballot box, and the forces/dynamics that are driving that degradation have continued unabated despite every red line[[3]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kmx3rKh2K4ANwMqpW/destabilization-of-the-united-states-the-top-x-factor-ea#_ftn3) that has been crossed to date. And I’m not optimistic that the red line crossed yesterday will be any different.

Preface

Epistemic status:

I have thought a lot about this over the years and was warning about risks to American democracy before the topic entered mainstream and often sensationalized discourse.. I could be more well read on academic literature, however I think it likely wouldn’t change my views much on diagnosis and prognosis of the situation[[4]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kmx3rKh2K4ANwMqpW/destabilization-of-the-united-states-the-top-x-factor-ea#_ftn4) but could greatly influence my views of the prescription. This is a topic that lends itself to getting lost in the rabbit hole and alarmism. My greatest hesitation about the gravity of the situation is the fact that many very intelligent people come to very different conclusions than me; however, I have yet to see an argument I found compelling. I think the probability of a destabilizing event rests a lot on people’s subjective judgements. **Below is an overview of my confidence on a few items in this piece:**

* Very confident that destabilization is more likely than EAs appreciate.
* Confident the consequences of destabilization make it an X-factor.
* Moderately confident it’s neglected financially relative to severity as an X-factor and relative to money injected annually into polarization efforts (read: culture war).
* Very confident the problem is quite difficult to solve.
* Very low confidence in most proposed interventions; modest confidence on a couple.

 My top reading/listening recommendations are:

1. Robert Evans’ podcast series *It Could Happen Here* (March – May 2019)
   1. Not to be confused with a book of the same name by Jonathan Greenblatt, the head of the Anti-Defamation League.
   2. In August 2021, Evans released a daily podcast under the *It Could Happen Here*name. This is not the content I am referencing. If you are searching on a service like Spotify, you will need to sort the podcast episodes from oldest to newest to find the original series released in 2019.[[5]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kmx3rKh2K4ANwMqpW/destabilization-of-the-united-states-the-top-x-factor-ea#_ftn5)
2. Ezra Klein’s book *Why We’re Polarized*
3. Robert Evans’s podcast miniseries “Behind the Insurrection” (a set of episodes from his *Behind the Bastards* podcast he released in the wake of January 6th)
4. Daniel Ziblatt and Steve Levitsky’s *How Democracies Die* and *Tyranny of the Minority*
   1. (if you don’t want to read a whole book, watch their presentation at Politics and Prose)

 This is an extended version of my submission to the Open Philanthropy (OP) Cause Area Competition. The word limit and scoring structure affected the final product (I would prefer to have focused more on the possibility and importance of a destabilization event). I have been working independently on an informal effort to make the case that EA should prioritize protecting American democracy and ambitious structural change in the U.S. political system. (The latter is not just because of its role in the former but also because it has immense upside benefits even if American democracy were secure). Reach out if you are interested in collaborating or just want to give words of encouragement.

Apologies in advance for switching back and forth between nationality-neutral and American-centric language (e.g. the *American* government vs. *our* government). I know EA is majority non-Americans; although throughout this piece I feel like I am appealing especially to American EAs.

Acknowledgements

Rawan, Woody Campbell, Mike Berkowitz, Professor Spivey, Steve Thompson, Kyle Lucchese, Tom Latkowski, František Drahota, and public libraries.

Summary

The trajectory of polarization, increasing minoritarian rule, and the erosion of democratic norms and the rule of law in the United States is unsustainable. The forces that are driving this trajectory (the revenue models of social media and news media, and structural political incentives) are deeply entrenched and are known to us. Yet, if there was going to be an intervening force sufficient to alter our trajectory, it should have appeared by now (especially in the wake of the January 6th, 2021 insurrection). Continuing on this path–in addition to high levels of government dysfunction (also worthy of EA’s attention)–will eventually yield destabilization. Destabilization which would likely manifest as an authoritarian regime or civil conflict (likely sparked by a failed authoritarian power grab).[[6]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kmx3rKh2K4ANwMqpW/destabilization-of-the-united-states-the-top-x-factor-ea#_ftn6)

The consequences of destabilization of the world’s most powerful superpower are immense, (including for suffering, x-risks, and the long-term future) and could be the catastrophic event that cascades into an existential event. Destabilization of the nation that is home to the largest efforts addressing artificial intelligence, bio-risk, and climate disruption would also be devasting for the EA movement because of the amount of EA talent in the United States and the degree to which the handful of fortunes (of Americans) that represent the vast majority of pledged EA funds are tied to the health of the America system. For example, a right-wing authoritarian could shutdown Facebook or take other actions that would wipe out most of its stock value; Forbes states that the majority of the net worth of Dustin Moskovitz—the principal source of OP’s funding—is from his estimated 2% stake in Facebook; billions of dollars of EA/OP funding would evaporate if this scenario were to happen.

OP and the Effective Altruism community can take a multitude of actions, many of which not only decrease the chance of destabilization but also have the upside of making our government function better, thus having a force-multiplier effect on the outcomes our trillion-dollar government. Action is urgently needed, but unfortunately most interventions have either a very unclear cost-effectiveness or appear to not meet OP’s typical 1000x standard in short-term measurements. However, a medium-level investigation could change the perspective on return on investment. Effective Altruism at large needs to explore the risk of destabilization of the United States, given the possibility it could become one of EA’s top X-factors.

If anyone reading this would like to discuss or collaborate on this topic, please reach out! Also, let me know if this changed your opinions/priors at all AND/OR what arguments you think need to be improved.

Possibility

Here is a distillation of my argument: the experts that I have read understand the situation as the elements and dynamics depicted in [this flow chart](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1LOIO6jsnDJhANoaRTxhvlMJYOnmBCEOBgC0ETgKiZIs/edit?usp=sharing). The reasons they cite for why they are not pessimistic about the worst-case scenario do not address the mechanisms of the situation and are more so hunches, each of which has a strong counter argument. They openly give the impression that they are optimistic because it is practical rather than intellectually merited. I am merely looking at the trajectory (where the flow chart is taking us) and the inertia (the fact that nothing has intervened to change the trajectory after an unprecedented presidency, pandemic, and insurrection), and making the logical jump that the end point is eventually destabilization.

Big picture

Authoritarianism

Democracies have fallen into authoritarian regimes throughout the past 100 years, and scholars have studied those instances to create a playbook of how tyrants successfully come to power in democracies. [[7]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kmx3rKh2K4ANwMqpW/destabilization-of-the-united-states-the-top-x-factor-ea#_ftn7)  Trump has partially or completely checked off every box except for crippling the opposition and wresting control of the security forces[[8]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kmx3rKh2K4ANwMqpW/destabilization-of-the-united-states-the-top-x-factor-ea#_ftn8) (the latter being the most important).

Trump was unsuccessful in seizing power, however many people have interpreted the wrong lesson—our institutions work, we can be optimistic about democracy. The process of resisting Trump’s power grab and January 6th made them weaker, and they continue to be eroded—not rebuilt—to this day.[[9]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kmx3rKh2K4ANwMqpW/destabilization-of-the-united-states-the-top-x-factor-ea#_ftn9) The pathway to power has been illuminated for other would-be authoritarians. The Trump-wing of the Republican party is finding decent success in replacing non-radical Republicans in critical positions to enable a future “constitutional coup.” The next authoritarian in the White House, be it Trump or someone more competent, will have much more success. These are the concerns of a number of serious scholars and pundits.[[10]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kmx3rKh2K4ANwMqpW/destabilization-of-the-united-states-the-top-x-factor-ea#_ftn10)

The demise of democracies into presidential autocracies, fascist regimes, and one-party states is an arc, not a linear line. The rise of fascism in the 30s occurred on a sharp arc relative to the gentler curve of illiberal authoritarianism of Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Daniel Ziblatt and Steve Levitsky, the authors of How Democracies Die, emphasize how modern democracies deteriorate over longer time scales that enable a [boiling-frog syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boiling_frog).

I contend that both a sharp and gentle curve are possible. The important point is that we could be near or past the inflection point of the curve. In Behind the Bastards’ miniseries “Behind the Insurrection,” journalist Robert Evans focuses on how insurrections, paramilitary groups, political violence, enablement of authoritarians by establishment politicians, and a voter base of around 30% of the population were at the inflection point of fascist regimes that came to power or attempted to come to power. In more recent regimes birthed from democracies, How Democracies Die emphasizes the erosion of the democratic norms forbearance and mutual toleration, establishment politicians enabling the aspiring authoritarian, and the aspiring authoritarian being elected to power in more recent.[[11]](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kmx3rKh2K4ANwMqpW/destabilization-of-the-united-states-the-top-x-factor-ea#_ftn11) The United States has roughly analogous features in the present situation.

#### 5. Con-con is a voting issue. There’s no deficits that assume fiat.

**--Democracy Turn---2AC**

#### 6. Turn.

**It shatters democracy.**

Jay Riestenberg 18. MA in Political Management from George Washington University, citing three Supreme Court Justices, two US Solicitor Generals, one US Attorney General, and thirty-one Professors of Law. “U.S. Constitution Threatened as Article V Convention Movement Nears Success.” Common Cause. 5/31/2018. https://www.commoncause.org/resource/u-s-constitution-threatened-as-article-v-convention-movement-nears-success/

A well-funded, highly coordinated national effort is underway to call a constitutional convention, under Article V of the U.S. Constitution, for the first time in history. The result of such a convention could be a complete overhaul of the Constitution and supporters of the convention are dangerously close to succeeding. With special interest groups gaining more momentum, conservative advocates are just six states short of reaching the constitutionally-required 34-state goal. They are targeting Republican-controlled legislatures in 2021 and are within striking distance.

The unknowns surrounding a constitutional convention pose an unacceptable risk, particularly in the current polarized political climate. Given how close calling a new convention is, it’s time to spotlight that risk and sound an alarm for the preservation of our Constitution.

Too few Americans are even aware that a constitutional convention can be called, let alone that there would be no checks on its scope and further that the process to call one is well underway and being underwritten by some of the nation’s richest individuals.

Calls for a convention are coming from right and left, with more money, a stronger campaign structure, and national coordination on the right. A number of major conservative organizations and donors, including Mercer family and Koch-funded groups such as the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), have renewed and intensified efforts to thrust this issue into the spotlight after years of inactivity.

This memo that outlines the different campaigns calling for an Article V convention and why it is just a dangerous idea. These calls for a constitutional convention represent the most serious threat to our democracy flying almost completely under the radar.

**Global war.**

Kosuke Imai & James Lo 20. Professor in the Department of Government and Department of Statistics at Harvard University. Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Southern California at Los Angeles. “Robustness of Empirical Evidence for the Democratic Peace: A Nonparametric Sensitivity Analysis.” Harvard Research. 6/3/2020. https://imai.fas.harvard.edu/research/files/dempeace.pdf

The democratic peace — the idea that democracies rarely fight one another — has been called “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations.” Yet, some contend that this relationship is spurious and suggest alternative explanations. Unfortunately, in the absence of randomized experiments, we can never rule out the possible existence of such confounding biases. Rather than commonly used regression-based approaches, we apply a nonparametric sensitivity analysis. We show that overturning the positive association between democracy and peace would require a confounder that is 47 times more prevalent in democratic dyads than in other dyads. To put this number in context, the relationship between democracy and peace is at least five times as robust as that between smoking and lung cancer. To explain away the democratic peace, therefore, scholars must find far more powerful confounders than already those identified in the literature.

## Coercion

### Coercion DA---2AC

#### Use consequentialism.

#### Tradeoffs.

Regression.

#### No link. Not join

#### Violates autonomy.

## Rates

### Inflation DA---2AC

#### 1. Inflation will be long term AND no cuts

Jonnelle Marte 9-23. “Fed’s Bostic Says He’s Worried About Inflation, Sees More Coming.” Bloomberg. 9-23-2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-23/fed-s-bostic-says-he-s-worried-about-inflation-sees-more-coming?embedded-checkout=true

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta President Raphael Bostic said he sees more inflation coming, underscoring that the US central bank needs to remain on guard against price pressures.

“Not having been at target for over four-and-a-half years, we definitely need to be concerned about it,” Bostic said Tuesday on the Macro Musings podcast, hosted by David Beckworth of the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. “I think it’s incumbent upon us to continue to stay vigilant in the fight against inflation.”

After keeping rates on hold all year, the Fed lowered its benchmark last week by a quarter percentage point, bringing it to a target range of 4% to 4.25%. Fed Chair Jerome Powell framed the move as a “risk-management cut” to provide some support for the labor market after job growth slowed dramatically this year.

“The sentiment around the risks to employment have gone up a lot and they are, for many, comparable to the risks to inflation,” Bostic said. “That is creating some tension in terms of what the right policy should be.”

Bostic said in a Wall Street Journal interview published Monday that he was comfortable with last week’s rate reduction but was not ready to commit to further easing this year given elevated inflation.

#### 2. Trump turns the DA.

#### a) Data. Expertise at the BLS is key to growth and effective monetary policy.

Anne Krueger 25. Former World Bank chief economist, senior researchprofessor of international economics at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies." Lies, Damned Lies, and Donald Trump's Statistics." 8/21/2025. project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-actions-undermine-reliability-of-us-economic-data-by-anne-o-krueger-2025-08

WASHINGTON, DC – Statistics may seem dull, but they are indispensable. Without them, policymakers – and those tasked with implementing their decisions – would be unable to do their jobs. Reliable data form the foundation of sound governance, playing a central role in shaping monetary and fiscal policy and supporting and forecasting demand for infrastructure, commodities, schools, hospitals, and water.

Similarly, private companies rely on information about population growth, wage trends, and other key indicators to guide investment decisions and production strategies. The more reliable the data, the more valuable they become.

But when the reliability of official figures is in doubt, uncertainty grows, leading to poor decision-making. A census, for example, is useful only to the extent that people trust it to provide an accurate picture of population trends. For this reason, essential statistics should be regarded as public goods: their value increases when they are credible, accessible, and widely shared.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics is one of the United States’ most vital sources of reliable economic statistics, guiding policymakers, businesses, and investors alike. Each month, the BLS publishes data on employment, unemployment, consumer prices, and wages – not just at the national level but also by state, region, and municipality. The accuracy of these numbers has steadily improved over time, making them trusted benchmarks for businesses and governments worldwide. As The Economist recently noted, “trillions of dollars in global assets reprice within moments of a BLS release.”

That hard-won reputation was severely – and perhaps irreparably – damaged when US President Donald Trump abruptly fired BLS Commissioner Erika McEntarfer just hours after the release of the bureau’s July report, which revealed a sharp slowdown in employment growth and revised down earlier job gains. Trump claimed the figures were “phony” and “rigged” to make him and the Republican Party look bad.

These allegations were of course completely baseless. In reality, BLS commissioners do not see the final numbers until shortly before their public release. Moreover, the agency has refined its accounting methods to address problems like underreporting and misreporting.

Even prominent Republican economists have criticized Trump’s actions. Steve Hanke, who served as an adviser to former President Ronald Reagan, dismissed Trump’s claims of political interference in BLS statistics. “Whoever is at the top is pretty much irrelevant,” he told the Financial Times. “The bureaucracy and the template dictate what goes on. The idea that you can blatantly manipulate the data is frankly just rubbish.”

By undermining the BLS, Trump has placed the US in the company of authoritarian governments that regularly manipulate or conceal unfavorable figures. Most notoriously, data from the Soviet Union were widely considered dubious, even by Soviet officials. Over the past two decades, Russian President Vladimir Putin has compromised the reliability of Russia’s economic statistics, echoing Soviet-era practices.

Likewise, despite China’s considerable efforts since opening its economy to enhance the credibility of official data, it remains difficult to imagine any statistician openly defying demands from President Xi Jinping. This was evident in August 2023, when Chinese authorities temporarily stopped publishing youth unemployment figures after the widely used measure hit a record high.

Elsewhere, particularly in developing countries, budgetary constraints and large informal sectors have often limited the reliability of government statistics. The most dependable data tend to come from developed economies like the US, where nonpartisan technocrats generate high-quality estimates that support effective policymaking, business decisions, and research.

Trump’s decision to replace McEntarfer with an ultra-loyalist, E.J. Antoni, poses a serious threat to the ability of the BLS to fulfill its mission. Unsurprisingly, many have questioned Antoni’s qualifications and impartiality. As Jessica Riedl of the conservative Manhattan Institute observed, “no credible economist would take a job in which you’d get fired for publishing accurate data.”

Even if Antoni were qualified (which he is not), serious doubts would remain about whether BLS estimates could be trusted. Loss of confidence in the agency’s data will only deepen the uncertainty facing private and public decision-makers. Worse still, these doubts are likely to extend beyond labor statistics, especially when figures such as inflation rates conflict with Trump’s political agenda. The consequences for the US and global economy, not to mention for democratic governance, could be catastrophic.

#### b) Deregulation. It causes systemic collapse that overturns ability regulate the economy. Extinction from disease, ecological breakdown, and prolif.

George Monbiot 25. Open Scholar at Oxford, Orwell Prize Winner. “There are many ways Trump could trigger a global collapse. Here’s how to survive if that happens.” 2/18/25. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/feb/18/donald-trump-global-collapse-wildfires-pandemic-financial-crisis.

Though we might find it hard to imagine, we cannot now rule it out: the possibility of systemic collapse in the United States. The degradation of federal government by Donald Trump and Elon Musk could trigger a series of converging and compounding crises, leading to social, financial and industrial failure.

There are several possible mechanisms. Let’s start with an obvious one: their assault on financial regulation. Trump’s appointee to the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Russell Vought, has suspended all the agency’s activity, slashed its budget and could be pursuing Musk’s ambition to “delete” the bureau. The CFPB was established by Congress after the 2008 financial crisis, to protect people from the predatory activity that helped trigger the crash. The signal to the financial sector could not be clearer: “Fill your boots, boys.” A financial crisis in the US would immediately become a global crisis.

But the hazards extend much further. Musk, calling for a “wholesale removal of regulations”, sends his child soldiers to attack government departments stabilising the entire US system. Regulations, though endlessly maligned by corporate and oligarchic propaganda, are all that protect us from multiple disasters. In its initial impacts, deregulation is class war, hitting the poorest and the middle classes at the behest of the rich. As the effects proliferate, it becomes an assault on everyone’s wellbeing.

To give a couple of examples, the fires in Los Angeles this year are expected to cost, on various estimates, between $28bn and $75bn in insured losses alone. Estimates of total losses range from $160bn to $275bn. These immense costs are likely to be dwarfed by future climate disasters. As Trump rips down environmental protections and trashes federal responsiveness, the impacts will spiral. They could include non-linear shocks to either the insurance sector or homeowners, escalating into US-wide economic and social crisis.

If (or when) another pandemic strikes, which could involve a pathogen more transmissible and even more deadly than Covid-19 (which has so far killed 1.2 million people in the US), it will hit a nation whose defences have been stood down. Basic public health measures, such as vaccination and quarantine, might be inaccessible to most. A pandemic in these circumstances could end millions of lives and cause spontaneous economic shutdown.

Because there is little public understanding of how complex systems operate, collapse tends to take almost everyone by surprise. Complex systems (such as economies and human societies) have characteristics that make them either resilient or fragile. A system that loses its diversity, redundancy, modularity (the degree of compartmentalisation), its “circuit breakers” (such as government regulations) and backup strategies (alternative means of achieving a goal) is less resilient than one which retains these features. So is a system whose processes become synchronised. In a fragile system, shocks can amplify more rapidly and become more transmissible: a disruption in one place proliferates into disaster everywhere. This, as Andy Haldane, former chief economist at the Bank of England, has deftly explained, is what happened to the financial system in 2008.

A consistent feature of globalised capitalism is an unintentional assault on systemic resilience. As corporations pursue similar profit-making strategies, and financialisation and digitisation permeate every enterprise, the economic system loses its diversity and starts to synchronise. As they consolidate, and the biggest conglomerates become hubs to which many other enterprises are connected (think of Amazon or the food and farming giant Cargill), major failures could cascade at astonishing speed.

As every enterprise seeks efficiencies, the system loses its redundancy. As trading rules and physical infrastructure are standardised (think of those identical container terminals, shipping and trucking networks), the system loses both modularity and backup strategies. When a system has lost its resilience, a small external shock can trigger cascading collapse.

Paradoxically, with his trade wars and assault on global standards, Trump could help to desynchronise the system and reintroduce some modularity. But, as he simultaneously rips down circuit breakers, undermines preparedness and treats Earth systems as an enemy to be crushed, the net effect is likely to make human systems more prone to collapse.

At least in the short term, the far right tends to benefit from chaos and disruption: this is another of the feedback loops that can turn a crisis into a catastrophe. Trump presents himself as the hero who will save the nation from the ruptures he has caused, while deflecting the blame on to scapegoats.

Alternatively, if collapse appears imminent, Trump and his team might not wish to respond. Like many of the ultra-rich, key figures in or around the administration entertain the kind of psychopathic fantasies indulged by Ayn Rand in her novels Atlas Shrugged and The Fountainhead, in which plutocrats leave the proles to die in the inferno they’ve created, while they migrate to their New Zealand bunkers, Mars or the ocean floor (forgetting, as they always do, that their wealth, power and survival is entirely dependent on other people). Or they yearn for a different apocalypse, in which the rest of us roast while they party with Jesus in his restored kingdom.

Every government should hope for the best and prepare for the worst. But, as they do with climate and ecological breakdown, freshwater depletion, the possibility of food system collapse, antibiotic resistance and nuclear proliferation, most governments, including the UK’s, now seem to hope for the best and leave it there. So, though there is no substitute for effective government, we must seek to create our own backup systems.

#### 3. No link.

#### a) State, local, and private sector employees outweigh. The plan only affects one million workers. That’s Finkin.

<For Reference>

Before addressing the AFPI report’s explanation of its findings, there are reasons to be skeptical of its data. It is estimated that there are about 2.3 million full-time federal employees, with over a million—a number that has been increasing—being represented by unions and having access to arbitration. The report notes that, according to OPM records, thousands of federal employees with permanent civil service status are dismissed each year. Only a small fraction of dismissals lead to administrative proceedings. For cases of unacceptable performance, notice and an opportunity to improve typically are required by statute as a pre-condition to discharge, thereby affording employees a means of preserving employment.

#### b) There’s six decades of thumpers and federal workers can’t even bargain over wages or strike.

Andrea Hsu 25. Journalist. "How Trump is decimating federal employee unions one step at a time." NPR. 8/31/2025. npr.org/2025/09/01/nx-s1-5515633/trump-federal-workers-labor-unions-va

Federal employees have had the right to join unions and collectively bargain over working conditions since the 1960s. Unlike private sector workers, government employees cannot negotiate wages or strike. But through collective bargaining, they do help shape disciplinary procedures, parental leave policies, how overtime is managed and much more.

### --AT: Development---2AC

#### The aff solves. Reversing USAID firings is the biggest internal link to development. They control billions in disease, water, and education funding.

Ellen Knickmeyer 25. Reporter for the Associated Press, with Matthew Lee. "Almost all USAID workers will be pulled off the job worldwide, Trump administration says." PBS News. 2-5-2025. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/almost-all-usaid-workers-will-be-pulled-off-the-job-worldwide-trump-administration-says

The mass removal of thousands of staffers would doom billions of dollars in projects in some 120 countries, including security assistance for Ukraine and other countries, as well as development work for clean water, job training and education, including for schoolgirls under Taliban rule in Afghanistan.

The online notification to USAID workers and contractors said they would be off the job, effective just before midnight Friday, unless deemed essential. Direct hires of the agency overseas got 30 days to return home, while contractors would be fired, the notice said.

Thousands already had been laid off and programs worldwide shut down after Trump, a Republican, imposed a sweeping freeze on foreign assistance. Despite outcry from Democratic lawmakers, the aid agency has been a special target as the administration and Musk’s so-called Department of Government Efficiency look to shrink the government.

They have ordered a spending stop that has paralyzed U.S.-funded aid and development work, gutted the agency’s senior leadership and workforce with furloughs and firings, and closed the Washington headquarters to staffers Monday.

“Spent the weekend feeding USAID into the wood chipper,” Musk boasted on X.

The United States is the world’s largest humanitarian donor by far. It spends less than 1% of its budget on foreign assistance, a smaller share of its budget than some countries.

Hundreds of millions of dollars of food and medication already delivered by U.S. companies are sitting in ports because of the shutdown.

Health programs like those credited with helping end polio and smallpox epidemics and an acclaimed HIV/AIDS program that saved more than 20 million lives in Africa have stopped. So have programs for monitoring and deploying rapid-response teams for contagious diseases such as an Ebola outbreak in Uganda.

South African Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi told Parliament on Wednesday that officials scrambled to meet with U.S. Embassy staff for information after receiving no warning the Trump administration would freeze crucial funding for the world’s biggest national HIV/AIDS program.

South Africa has the world’s highest number of people living with HIV, at around 8 million, and the United States funds around 17% of its $2.3 billion-a-year program through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR. The health minister did not say whether U.S. exemptions for lifesaving care affect that work.

#### Rates are not key whatsoever.

The World Bank 23, 1/10/2023, "Global Economic Prospects: Sharp, Long-lasting Slowdown to Hit Developing Countries Hard," https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/01/10/global-economic-prospects

WASHINGTON, Jan. 10, 2023 — Global growth is slowing sharply in the face of elevated inflation, higher interest rates, reduced investment, and disruptions caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to the World Bank’s latest Global Economic Prospects report.

Given fragile economic conditions, any new adverse development—such as higher-than-expected inflation, abrupt rises in interest rates to contain it, a resurgence of the COVID-19 pandemic, or escalating geopolitical tensions—could push the global economy into recession. This would mark the first time in more than 80 years that two global recessions have occurred within the same decade.

The global economy is projected to grow by 1.7% in 2023 and 2.7% in 2024. The sharp downturn in growth is expected to be widespread, with forecasts in 2023 revised down for 95% of advanced economies and nearly 70% of emerging market and developing economies.

Over the next two years, per-capita income growth in emerging market and developing economies is projected to average 2.8%—a full percentage point lower than the 2010-2019 average. In Sub-Saharan Africa—which accounts for about 60% of the world’s extreme poor—growth in per capita income over 2023-24 is expected to average just 1.2%, a rate that could cause poverty rates to rise, not fall.

“The crisis facing development is intensifying as the global growth outlook deteriorates,” said World Bank Group President David Malpass. “Emerging and developing countries are facing a multi-year period of slow growth driven by heavy debt burdens and weak investment as global capital is absorbed by advanced economies faced with extremely high government debt levels and rising interest rates. Weakness in growth and business investment will compound the already-devastating reversals in education, health, poverty, and infrastructure and the increasing demands from climate change.”

Growth in advanced economies is projected to slow from 2.5% in 2022 to 0.5% in 2023. Over the past two decades, slowdowns of this scale have foreshadowed a global recession. In the United States, growth is forecast to fall to 0.5% in 2023—1.9 percentage points below previous forecasts and the weakest performance outside of official recessions since 1970. In 2023, euro-area growth is expected at zero percent—a downward revision of 1.9 percentage points. In China, growth is projected at 4.3% in 2023—0.9 percentage point below previous forecasts.

Excluding China, growth in emerging market and developing economies is expected to decelerate from 3.8% in 2022 to 2.7% in 2023, reflecting significantly weaker external demand compounded by high inflation, currency depreciation, tighter financing conditions, and other domestic headwinds.

By the end of 2024, GDP levels in emerging and developing economies will be roughly 6% below levels expected before the pandemic. Although global inflation is expected to moderate, it will remain above pre-pandemic levels.

The report offers the first comprehensive assessment of the medium-term outlook for investment growth in emerging market and developing economies. Over the 2022-2024 period, gross investment in these economies is likely to grow by about 3.5% on average—less than half the rate that prevailed in the previous two decades. The report lays out a menu of options for policy makers to accelerate investment growth.

“Subdued investment is a serious concern because it is associated with weak productivity and trade and dampens overall economic prospects. Without strong and sustained investment growth, it is simply impossible to make meaningful progress in achieving broader development and climate-related goals,” said Ayhan Kose, Director of the World Bank’s Prospects Group. “National policies to boost investment growth need to be tailored to country circumstances but they always start with establishing sound fiscal and monetary policy frameworks and undertaking comprehensive reforms in the investment climate.”

## Agenda

### Agenda DA---2AC

#### 1. Court action shields the plan’s unpopularity.

McKinzie Craig & Joseph Daniel Ura 25. Assistant director at the Louisiana State University Paul M. Herbert Law Center, Ph.D. in political science and government from Texas A&M University. Professor of political science at Clemson University, Ph.D. in political science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. "Policy, Position-Taking, and Congressional Voting under Judicial Review." *American Politics Research*, 0.0, 2.

Scholars have also identified a number of deeper, more subtle ways that institution of judicial review influences congressional behavior. Thayer (1893), for example, argues that judicial review insures against unpalatable policy outcomes, creating a moral hazard for members of Congress. He writes, “No doubt our doctrine of constitutional law has had a tendency to drive out questions justice and right, and to fill the mind of legislators with thoughts of mere legality…‘if we are wrong,’ they say, ‘the courts will correct it’” (1893, pp. 155- 156). Rogers (2001) similarly argues that legislators’ knowing courts will ultimately review their decisions induces them to enact riskier laws than they would have in the absence of subsequent judicial scrutiny. Fox and Stephenson (2011) likewise claim judicial review creates incentives for legislators to “posture by taking some bold, dramatic action in order to appear competent to voters” even if the legislature is “insufficiently confident that such dramatic action is warranted” (p. 398). Graber’s (1993) also describes how Congress effectively delegates some politically fraught policy choices to the judiciary so its members can avoid taking controversial or unpopular political positions (see also Whittington, 2005).1

This latter set of studies broadly shares Thayer’s (1893) perspective that judicial review acts as a kind of safety net or backstop for difficult political choices in legislatures. Congress makes law knowing the Supreme Court may rescue it and the country from decisions to enact risky, unreasonably bold, or otherwise imprudent policy choices.2 At least in some cases, the possibility courts may cushion the blow of bad policy may lead Congress to make different decisions than it would have in the absence of judicial review.

### --AT: Shutdown---2AC

#### Shutdown is guaranteed now.

Nolan D. McCaskill 9-23. Reporter for Reuters. "Trump scraps meeting with Democrats, raising government shutdown risk." Reuters. 9-23-2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-scraps-meeting-with-democrats-funding-us-shutdown-looms-2025-09-23/

U.S. President Donald Trump on Tuesday scrapped a meeting with top congressional Democratic leaders to discuss government funding, raising the risk of a partial government shutdown beginning next week.

Democrats and the Republican president postured to try to pin blame on each other for a potential shutdown, which would interfere with a range of federal services and likely furlough hundreds of thousands of federal workers.

"I have decided that no meeting with their congressional leaders could possibly be productive," Trump wrote in a post on his Truth Social media site.

Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer and House of Representatives Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries earlier on Tuesday said Trump had agreed to meet this week at the White House, before government funding expires on September 30. Lawmakers are at odds over so-called discretionary funding, which accounts for about one-quarter of the roughly $7 trillion federal budget.

"Democrats are ready to work to avoid a shutdown," Schumer said in a statement responding to Trump's message. "Trump and Republicans are holding America hostage."

At issue is how to win enough votes in the deeply divided Congress to pass a stopgap funding bill to keep the government operating into the new fiscal year starting October 1.

Schumer said it is also urgent for Congress to extend an enhanced tax credit for federally backed health insurance premiums, which is due to expire on December 31. Healthcare policy nonprofit KFF estimates out-of-pocket premium payments rising over 75% for the Affordable Care Act plan year beginning on October 1.

"It's the difference between a family trying to make the mortgage payment and having healthcare," Schumer told reporters at a press conference in New York's Brooklyn borough.

Republican leaders say they have not slammed the door on extending the tax credit, but have argued that a stopgap funding bill was not the place to accomplish that.

The Republican-led House passed a bill last week to extend government funding through November 21, but it failed in the Senate where Republicans hold 53 of the 100 seats.

Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson has said he does not intend to call House members back to Washington before October 1 - by which point the government will have shut down absent Senate action.

Johnson says his chamber completed its work when it passed its stopgap funding bill on Friday, a move that also presents the Senate - where bills require bipartisan support to pass - no chance to modify the House bill.

Jeffries told House Democrats to return to Washington from a week-long break on Monday.

#### The aff solves the impact within hours.

Nick Wertsch 25. Associate Director of Workplace Justice at Dēmos. “How Federal Workers Can Leverage Civil Disobedience as a Strategy to Win.” 5/25/25. https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/federal-workers-civil-disobedience.

Essential federal workers provide another example from 2019. In a failed effort to secure funding for a border wall, Trump shut down the federal government for more than a month. Without a federal spending bill in place, federal workers were either furloughed or forced to work for 35 days without pay. What ultimately ended Trump’s shutdown was a small group of air traffic controllers. Throughout the ordeal, the air traffic controller union leadership strongly disavowed any idea of striking, both publicly and privately, worried that it would trigger serious legal consequences for the union. But after performing high stress jobs for a month without pay, and once other labor movement leaders began to call for a general strike, air traffic controllers started to call in sick, grounding flights in major metros. Within hours of the sickout, Trump reached an agreement on a new spending bill. If coordinated with the intention of creating a work stoppage, these sickouts ran the legal risks described previously. But support for ending the shutdown was high, and the public blamed Trump for causing the crisis.

## Space

### Space DA---2AC

#### No ‘dominance’ impact.

John Mueller 21. Adjunct Professor of Political Science & Senior Research Scientist, Mershon Center for International Security Studies. “The Rise of China, the Assertiveness of Russia, and the Antics of Iran.” *The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency*, Chapter 6.

Complacency, Appeasement, Self-destruction, and the New Cold War

It could be argued that the policies proposed here to deal with the international problems, whether real or imagined, presented by China, Russia, and Iran constitute exercises not only in complacency, but also in appeasement. That argument would be correct. As discussed in the Prologue to this book, appeasement can work to avoid military conflict as can be seen in the case of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. As also discussed there, appeasement has been given a bad name by the experience with Hitler in 1938.

Hitlers are very rare, but there are some resonances today in Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping. Both are shrewd, determined, authoritarian, and seem to be quite intelligent, and both are fully in charge, are surrounded by sychophants, and appear to have essentially unlimited tenure in office. Moreover, both, like Hitler in the 1930s, are appreciated domestically for maintaining a stable political and economic environment. However, unlike Hitler, both run trading states and need a stable and essentially congenial international environment to flourish.128 Most importantly, except for China’s claim to Taiwan, neither seems to harbor Hitler-like dreams of extensive expansion by military means. Both are leading their countries in an illiberal direction which will hamper economic growth while maintaining a kleptocratic system. But this may be acceptable to populations enjoying historically high living standards and fearful of less stable alternatives. Both do seem to want to overcome what they view as past humiliations – ones going back to the opium war of 1839 in the case of China and to the collapse of the Soviet empire and then of the Soviet Union in 1989–91 in the case of Russia. Primarily, both seem to want to be treated with respect and deference. Unlike Hitler’s Germany, however, both seem to be entirely appeasable. That scarcely seems to present or represent a threat. The United States, after all, continually declares itself to be the indispensable nation. If the United States is allowed to wallow in such self-important, childish, essentially meaningless, and decidedly fatuous proclamations, why should other nations be denied the opportunity to emit similar inconsequential rattlings? If that constitutes appeasement, so be it. If the two countries want to be able to say they now preside over a “sphere of influence,” it scarcely seems worth risking world war to somehow keep them from doing so – and if the United States were substantially disarmed, it would not have the capacity to even try.

If China and Russia get off on self-absorbed pretensions about being big players, that should be of little concern – and their success rate is unlikely to be any better than that of the United States. Charap and Colton observe that “The Kremlin’s idee fixe that Russia needs to be the leader of a pack of post-Soviet states in order to be taken seriously as a global power broker is more of a feel-good mantra than a fact-based strategy, and it irks even the closest of allies.” And they further suggest that

The towel should also be thrown in on the geo-ideational shadow-boxing over the Russian assertion of a sphere of influence in post-Soviet Eurasia and the Western opposition to it. Would either side be able to specify what precisely they mean by a regional sphere of influence? How would it differ from, say, US relations with the western-hemisphere states or from Germany’s with its EU neighbors?129

Applying the Gingrich gospel, then, it certainly seems that, although China, Russia, and Iran may present some “challenges” to US policy, there is little or nothing to suggest a need to maintain a large US military force-in-being to keep these countries in line. Indeed, all three monsters seem to be in some stage of self-destruction or descent into stagnation – not, perhaps, unlike the Communist “threat” during the Cold War. Complacency thus seems to be a viable policy.

However, it may be useful to look specifically at a couple of worst-case scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China (after it builds up its navy more) and an invasion of the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia by Russia. It is wildly unlikely that China or Russia would carry out such economically self-destructive acts: the economic lessons from Putin’s comparatively minor Ukraine gambit are clear, and these are unlikely to be lost on the Chinese. Moreover, the analyses of Michael Beckley certainly suggest that Taiwan has the conventional military capacity to concentrate the mind of, if not necessarily fully to deter, any Chinese attackers. It has “spent decades preparing for this exact contingency,” has an advanced early warning system, can call into action massed forces to defend “fortified positions on home soil with precision-guided munitions,” and has supply dumps, booby traps, an wide array of mobile missile launchers, artillery, and minelayers. In addition, there are only 14 locations that can support amphibious landing and these are, not surprisingly, well-fortified by the defenders.130

The United States may not necessarily be able to deter or stop military attacks on Taiwan or on the Baltics under its current force levels.131 And if it cannot credibly do so with military forces currently in being, it would not be able to do so, obviously, if its forces were much reduced. However, the most likely response in either eventuality would be for the United States to wage a campaign of economic and military (including naval) harassment and to support local – or partisan – resistance as it did in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion there in 1979. 132 Such a response does not require the United States to have, and perpetually to maintain, huge forces in place and at the ready to deal with such improbable eventualities.

The current wariness about, and hostility toward, Russia and China is sometimes said to constitute “a new Cold War.”133 There are, of course, considerable differences. In particular, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union – indeed the whole international Communist movement – was under the sway of a Marxist theory that explicitly and determinedly advocated the destruction of capitalism and probably of democracy, and by violence to the degree required. Neither Russia nor China today sports such cosmic goals or is enamored of such destructive methods. However, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the United States was strongly inclined during the Cold War massively to inflate the threat that it imagined the Communist adversary to present. The current “new Cold War” is thus in an important respect quite a bit like the old one: it is an expensive, substantially militarized, and often hysterical campaign to deal with threats that do not exist or are likely to selfdestruct.134

It may also be useful to evaluate terms that are often bandied about in considerations within foreign policy circles about the rise of China, the assertiveness of Russia, and the antics of Iran. High among these is “hegemony.” Sorting through various definitions, Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow array several that seem to capture the essence of the concept: domination, controlling leadership, or the ability to shape international rules according to the hegemon’s own interests. Hegemony, then, is an extreme word suggesting supremacy, mastery, preponderant influence, and full control. Hegemons force others to bend to their will whether they like it or not. Reich and Lebow also include a mellower designation applied by John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan in which a hegemon is defined as an entity that has the ability to establish a set of norms that others willingly embrace.135 But this really seems to constitute an extreme watering-down of the word and suggests opinion leadership or entrepreneurship and success at persuasion, not hegemony.

Moreover, insofar as they carry meaning, the militarized application of American primacy and hegemony to order the world has often been a fiasco.136 Indeed, it is impressive that the hegemon, endowed by definition by what Reich and Lebow aptly call a grossly disproportionate military capacity, has had such a miserable record of military achievement since 1945 – an issue discussed frequently in this book.137 Reich and Lebow argue that it is incumbent on IR scholars to cut themselves loose from the concept of hegemony.138 It seems even more important for the foreign policy establishment to do so.

There is also absurdity in getting up tight over something as vacuous as the venerable “sphere of influence” concept (or conceit). The notion that world affairs are a process in which countries scamper around the world seeking to establish spheres of influence is at best decidedly unhelpful and at worst utterly misguided. But the concept continues to be embraced in some quarters as if it had some palpable meaning. For example, in early 2017, the august National Intelligence Council opined that “Geopolitical competition is on the rise as China and Russia seek to exert more sway over their neighboring regions and promote an order in which US influence does not dominate.”139 Setting aside the issue of the degree to which American “influence” could be said to “dominate” anywhere (we still wait, for example, for dominated Mexico supinely to pay for a wall to seal off its self-infatuated neighbor’s southern border), it doesn’t bloody well matter whether China or Russia has, or seems to have, a “sphere of influence” someplace or other.

More importantly, the whole notion is vapid and essentially meaningless. Except perhaps in Gilbert and Sullivan’s Iolanthe. When members of the House of Lords fail to pay sufficient respect to a group of women they take to be members of a ladies’ seminary who are actually fairies, their queen, outraged at the Lords’ collected effrontery, steps forward, proclaims that she happens to be an “influential fairy,” and then, with a few passes of her wand, brushes past the Lords’ pleas (“no!” “mercy!” “spare us!” and “horror!”), and summarily issues several edicts: a young man of her acquaintance shall be inducted into their House, every bill that gratifies his pleasure shall be passed, members shall be required to sit through the grouse and salmon season, and high office shall be obtainable by competitive examination. Now, that’s influence. In contrast, on December 21, 2017, when the United States sought to alter the status of Jerusalem, the United Nations General Assembly voted to repudiate the US stand in a nearly unanimous vote that included many US allies. Now, that’s not influence.

In fact, to push this point perhaps to an extreme, if we are entering an era in which economic motivations became paramount and in which military force is not deemed a sensible method for pursuing wealth, the idea of “influence” would become obsolete because, in principle, pure economic actors do not care much about influence. They care about getting rich. (As Japan and Germany have found, however, influence, status, and prestige tend to accompany the accumulation of wealth, but this is just an ancillary effect.) Suppose the president of a company could choose between two stories to tell the stockholders. One message would be, “We enjoy great influence in the industry. When we talk everybody listens. Our profits are nil.” The other would be, “No one in the industry pays the slightest attention to us or ever asks our advice. We are, in fact, the butt of jokes in the trade. We are making money hand over fist.” There is no doubt about which story would most thoroughly warm the stockholders’ hearts.

#### Space war is sci-fi.

Michael Neufeld 21. Senior Curator in the Space History Department; Ph.D. in Modern European History, Johns Hopkins University. A. Verville Fellow; Smithsonian and National Science Foundation fellowships; Smithsonian Distinguished Scholar. “Cold War – But No War – in Space.” *Militarizing Outer Space*, Chapter 2.

Space war has been a fixture of astroculture since the blossoming of science fiction in the late nineteenth century. Battles with aliens, space fighters, ray guns and laser weapons have been depicted in novels, comic books, movies and computer games, and this genre got a new lease on life with the release of the Star Wars motion picture in 1977. Yet in the more than seventy years since the end of the Second World War, when outer space was first penetrated by the V-2 ballistic missile, no hostile military action between two powers has ever taken place outside the atmosphere. Weapons, including nuclear warheads, have been tested in space and nations have destroyed their own spacecraft in anti-satellite (ASAT) systems tests. The Cold War between the United States, the Soviet Union and their allies drove the expenditure of trillions of dollars on military space systems. The end of that contest around 1990 did not significantly change the trajectory either. Still, no shots — or lasers — have been fired in engagements between space powers.

During the Cold War, space near the earth militarized but did not weaponize. Multiple national security satellite systems were put into space, but no weapons were permanently stationed in orbit or on the moon. The great-power consensus behind that process, which has had only a partial basis in international law and has sometimes looked like it might collapse, has remained in place until today because military satellite systems have stabilized, rather than destabilized, world order. While nuclear deterrence was the fundamental reason why the Cold War became, in the words of historian John Lewis Gaddis, ‘the long peace’ (at least in terms of great-power war, not the devastating proxy wars in the so-called Third World), reconnaissance and early warning spacecraft made a nuclear war much less likely.2 Nuclear arms control and eventual reduction were only possible because the superpowers could use ‘national technical means of verification,’ in the deliberately vague language of US-Soviet treaties, to determine how many delivery systems the other side had and what their capability was. Navigation and geodetic satellites were launched to make nuclear targeting much more accurate, and became critical to precision conventional strikes on earth after the Cold War was over, yet they are now essential to civilian life through vehicle and handheld navigation systems. In short and on balance, the militarization of near-earth space has been a positive force for global stability and the global economy, notwithstanding repeated threats to destabilize the regime with space weaponry. One more aspect is equally striking: the gulf between space fiction and space reality in the military realm only widened during and after the Cold War. Space war makes for popular entertainment, but so far, at least, it has made very little military or political sense.

### Security Agency DA---2AC

#### Inev.

#### Spacex.

#### No authority over contractors.

#### 1. No link: the aff doesn’t strike down the national security exemption, but rather says that Trump improperly classified workers. That’s Finkin.

<For Reference>

Rather than rely on findings and explanations that are not supported by data, we can better understand the impact of arbitration on national security from the text of the FSLMRS and from cases applying it. The EO’s abrogation of collective bargaining and grievance arbitration is predicated on the claim that, in an agency with a primary function in national security, even if not the dominant function, the obligation to bargain collectively with unions imposes inflexibility that threatens national security, irrespective of the work these employees do. However, by operation of law, the FSLMRS in 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(6) already prohibits a bargaining unit from including “any employee engaged in intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or security work which directly affects national security.” The FLRA has provided extensive interpretation of the meaning of subsection (b)(6)’s exemptions.

#### Which means the aff is targeted and excludes the DA’s workers.

Nicolas Handler 25. Associate Professor of Law at Texas A&M. “Unpacking Trump’s Attack on Federal Sector Unions.” 4/29/25 https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/unpacking-trump-s-attack-on-federal-sector-unions.

In addition, the unions could argue that, contrary to the requirement of Section 7103(b), collective bargaining rights can “be applied to” the targeted agencies “in a manner consistent with national security requirements and considerations.” Indeed, all of these agencies have been engaged in collective bargaining for decades, under presidents of both parties, without any apparent interference with national security. It is possible that in some cases the agencies’ missions or priorities have changed such that they are now more central to national security than they used to be. For instance, the list of targeted agencies includes Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which is poised to play an important role in the administration’s border security policy. The administration’s fact sheet, among other examples, notes that ICE’s CBA has created roadblocks to amending the agency’s cybersecurity policy. But it is less apparent why other agencies, like the Veterans Administration or the Food and Drug Administration, cannot continue under their existing contracts without impairing national security.